The idea of a pure theory of law

Most contemporary legal philosophers tend to take force to be an accessory to the law. According to this prevalent view the law primarily consists of a series of demands made on us; force, conversely, comes into play only when these demands fail to be satisfied. This book claims that this model should be jettisoned in favour of a radically different one: according to the proposed view, force is not an accessory to the law but rather its attribute. The law is not simply a set of rules incidentally guaranteed by force, but it should be understood as essentially rules about force. The book explores in detail the nature of this claim and develops its corollaries. It then provides an overview of the contemporary jurisprudential debates relating to force and violence, and defends its claims against well-known counter-arguments by Hart, Raz and others.This book offers an innovative insight into the concept of Pure Theory. In contrast to what was claimed by Hans Kelsen, the most eminent contributor to this theory, the author argues that the core insight of the Pure Theory is not to be found in the concept of a basic norm, or in the supposed absence of a conceptual relation between law and morality, but rather in the fundamental and comprehensive reformulation of how to model the functioning of the law intended as an ordering of force and violence.

• 1 Introduction p. 1
• 2 The Purity of the Pure Theory of Law p. 5
• I What is the Pure Theory of Law? p. 5
• II The Contest of Standpoints p. 6
• III The Kantian Manoeuvre p. 7
• IV The Purity of the Pure Theory p. 11
• V The Primitive Function of the Law p. 12
• VI The Demand Model of the Functioning of Law p. 16
• 3 Law as an Order of Force or Violence p. 21
• I Law and Violence p. 21
• II The Germ of Law p. 22
• III Violence and Self-Help in Roman Law p. 25
• IV The Effectiveness of Law p. 28
• V Force as Content of the Law p. 32
• VI Law and State p. 37
• VII Criticism p. 45
• 4 Law as Permission p. 53
• I Introduction p. 53
• II Empowerment p. 55
• III Permission p. 62
• IV The Naturalistic Logic of Permission p. 65
• V The Functioning of Permissions p. 72
• VI Exclusionary Permissions? p. 76
• 5 The Law as a Schema of Interpretation p. 79
• I Introduction p. 79
• II Schemata, Fictions and Institutional Facts p. 80
• III Schemata and Imagination p. 84
• IV Law and Order p. 87
• 6 Normative Monism p. 91
• I Introduction p. 91
• II Legal Monism p. 92
• III Normative Monism p. 98
• IV The Great Incompatibility p. 102
• V The Normative Jinx p. 113
• 7 Absolute Positivism p. 117
• I Introduction p. 117
• II Relative Positivism p. 119
• III Absolute Positivism Projected p. 120
• IV Agrippa's Trilemma p. 122
• V Absolute Positivism Developed p. 125
• VI Law as Legal Process p. 127
• VII The Basic Norm p. 135
• 8 Conclusion p. 138
• Bibliography p. 140
• Index p. 147