Allocating authority : who should do what in European and international law?

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Where to find it

Davis Library (6th floor)

Call Number
KZ1263 .A425 2018
Status
Available

Law Library — 1st Floor Collection (1st floor)

Call Number
KZ1263 .A425 2018
Status
Available

Authors, etc.

Names:

Summary

The question of which European or international institution should exercise public authority is a highly contested one. This new collection offers an innovative approach to answering this vexed question. It argues that by viewing public authority as relative, it allows for greater understanding of both its allocation and its legitimacy. Furthermore, it argues that relations between actors should reflect the comparative analysis of the legitimacy assets that each actor can bring into governance processes. Put succinctly, the volume illustrates that public authority is relative between actors and relative to specific legitimacy assets. Drawing on the expertise of leading scholars in the field, it offers a thought-provoking and rigorous analysis of the long debated question of who should do what in European and international law.

Contents

  • List of Contributors p. xi
  • 1 Introducing the Idea of Relative Authority p. 1 Joana Mendes and Ingo Venzke
  • I Authority in Global Governance p. 1
  • II Towards Relative Authority: Comparative Institutional Assessments p. 7
  • III Normative Traction: Towards a Framework for Assessment p. 11
  • A Legitimacy Claims p. 11
  • B The Separation of Powers: Dividing Governmental Functions p. 13
  • C Limits of the Separation of Powers and its Potential p. 15
  • IV Iterations in Supra- and International Practices p. 18
  • V Relative Authority in European and International Law p. 22
  • Part I Empirical and Normative Traction
  • 2 Democratic Legitimacy and Executive Rule-making: Positive Political Theory in Comparative Public Law p. 29 Susan Rose-Ackerman
  • I Positive Political Theory p. 31
  • A Presidential Systems p. 33
  • B Parliamentary Systems p. 35
  • II Judicial Review and the Democratic Legitimacy of Executive Rule-making: Four Cases p. 37
  • A The United States p. 38
  • B South Africa and Germany p. 39
  • i Constitutional Checks on Rule-making Processes p. 40
  • a South Africa p. 40
  • b Germany p. 43
  • C The European Union p. 46
  • III Review for Democratic Legitimacy-Old Habits and New Challenges p. 48
  • 3 In Search of a New Model of Checks and Balances for the EU: Beyond Separation of Powers p. 53 Eoin Carolan and Deirdre Curtin
  • I Introduction p. 53
  • II Reconsidering the European Union's Institutional Balance p. 55
  • A Institutional Separation: Where are we Now? p. 55
  • B Institutional Separation: Where are we Going? p. 57
  • i The Broad Case for the Separation of Powers p. 57
  • ii The Claim to Effectiveness p. 58
  • iii The Claim to Legitimacy p. 60
  • C Separated Powers: Where should we Go? p. 63
  • D What Values Could a System of Separation Promote Within the EU? p. 63
  • III Autonomy and Accountability in the EU's System of Separated Powers p. 66
  • A The Impact of Informal Practices on Formal Autonomy p. 67
  • B The Impact of Informal Practices on Formal Checks p. 69
  • C The Potential of Informal Practices p. 72
  • IV A Procedural Model of Checks and Balances? p. 74
  • 4 Bolstering Authority by Enhancing Communication: How Checks and Balances and Feedback Loops can Strengthen the Authority of the European Court of Human Rights p. 77 Mikael Rask Madsen
  • I Theoretical Framework: Public Authority as Object of Empirical Inquiry p. 79
  • II Empirical Analysis: Instances of Controversy and Defiance of the ECtHR p. 82
  • III Pathways to Legal Diplomacy: The Cyprus Case p. 84
  • IV Head-On Collisions: Judicial Adaptations in France p. 87
  • V Irreconcilable Norms: Prison Votes and the Impossibility of Agreement p. 89
  • VI 'Constitutional Polities': The Brighton Declaration and its Consequences p. 92
  • VII Strengthening Authority by Enhancing Communication and Participation p. 94
  • A Different Role for the Committee of Ministers p. 96
  • B Increased Participation before the Court p. 96
  • C Allowing for Appeals to the Grand Chamber p. 97
  • VIII Conclusion p. 98
  • 5 Authority Monism in International Organisations: A Historical Sketch p. 99 Jochen von Bernstorff
  • I The Authority Configuration in the First International Organisations p. 100
  • II The Evolution of the Authority-configuration in the Twentieth Century p. 106
  • III Conclusion-Controls through those 'Affected' by IO Policies p. 109
  • 6 No Institution is an Island: Checks and Balances in Global Governance p. 115 Andreas von Staden
  • I Introduction p. 115
  • II Types of Checks and Balances in Global Governance p. 118
  • A Conceptualising 'Checks' and 'Balances' p. 118
  • B Different Types of Checks and Balances p. 120
  • i Horizontal versus Vertical Checks and Balances p. 120
  • ii Intra- versus Inter-organisational Checks and Balances p. 121
  • iii Specific versus General Checks and Balances p. 121
  • III Examples of Select Types of Checks and Balances in Global Governance p. 121
  • A Horizontal Checks and Balances in Global Governance p. 122
  • i Intra-organisational Arrangements p. 122
  • ii Inter-organisational Arrangements p. 126
  • B Vertical Checks and Balances p. 130
  • i Veto Power p. 131
  • ii (Threatening) Exit p. 131
  • iii Treaty Amendment and Renegotiation p. 132
  • iv Non-compliance p. 133
  • v Minimalist Compliance p. 134
  • IV Explaining the Scarcity of Horizontal Checks and Balances beyond the State p. 134
  • A Lack of Consequential Decision-making Authority p. 135
  • B Lack of Incentives for Executives to Install Horizontal Checks p. 136
  • C Different Characteristics of Principal p. 137
  • V Conclusion p. 138
  • Part II Iterations in Practice
  • 7 The Role of the Court of Justice in Shaping the Institutional Balance in the EU p. 143 Bruno De Witte
  • I Introduction p. 143
  • II Justification of Institutional Variation: The Treaties and Nothing But the Treaties p. 145
  • III Drawing the Borderline between Legislative and Administrative Action p. 149
  • IV Umpiring Disputes between the Political Institutions p. 151
  • V Legitimising 'Creative' Institutional Practice p. 153
  • VI Conclusion p. 156
  • 8 Refining Relative Authority: The Judicial Branch in the New Separation of Powers p. 159 Joseph Corkin
  • I Conceptualising Law-making's Diffusion p. 161
  • II What of the Elected Hierarchy? p. 164
  • III Blending Horizontal and Vertical Accountabilities p. 168
  • IV The Role of the Judicial Branch p. 170
  • V As Operationalised by the Court of Justice p. 175
  • VI Concluding Remarks p. 180
  • 9 Judicial Review of EU Administrative Discretion: How Far Does the Separation of Powers Matter? p. 183 Dominique Ritleng
  • I Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion and Separation of Powers Between the Legislature and the Executive p. 188
  • A Before Lisbon: Administrative Discretion Equated with Legislative Discretion p. 190
  • B After Lisbon: Nothing New Under the Sun p. 196
  • i Incentive to Differentiated Judicial Review p. 196
  • ii Disappointment p. 198
  • C Should There Be Any Difference at All? p. 201
  • II Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion and Separation of Powers Between the Judge and the Administration p. 203
  • A General or Individual Acts and Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion p. 205
  • B Decision-maker, Enactment Procedures and Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion p. 208
  • i Delegated and Implementing Acts p. 209
  • ii Legal Acts of EU Agencies p. 211
  • iii Legal Acts of the European Central Bank p. 214
  • 113 Conclusion p. 215
  • 10 First or Second Best? Judicial Law-making in European Private Law p. 217 Chantal Mak
  • I European Courts in Times of Societal Change p. 217
  • II Institutional Constraints: Dividing Powers among Legislatures and Judiciaries p. 219
  • A Constitutionalism and Private Law in Europe p. 219
  • B Democratic Legitimacy in a Multi-level Order p. 221
  • C Input and Output Legitimacy p. 223
  • III Institutional Realism: Judicial Law-making in European Private Law p. 225
  • A On Spanish Mortgages p. 225
  • B Aziz p. 226
  • C Sánchez Morcillo p. 229
  • D Unicaja Banco and Caixabank p. 230
  • E Social Reality and Democratic Ideals p. 231
  • IV Institutional Imagination: Rethinking the Role of the Judiciary p. 231
  • A Democracy and European Private Law Adjudication p. 231
  • B Democratic Experimentalism p. 234
  • C Experiments in European Private Law p. 235
  • D First or Second Best? p. 237
  • V Realists and Visionaries p. 240
  • 11 Relative Authority in Global and EU Financial Regulation: Linking the Legitimacy Debates p. 241 Maurizia De Bellis
  • I Global Regulation, the EU, and the New Separation of Powers p. 241
  • II A Preliminary Caveat: Global Financial Standards between Soft and Hard Law p. 245
  • III The Fragmentation of Powers in the Global Financial Regulatory Architecture p. 247
  • A The Evolution of Global Financial Regulators and the Separation of Powers before the Crisis p. 247
  • B Concentrating Powers: The FSB as the Centre of Global Financial Governance p. 249
  • C The Limits of Concentration: Assessing the G20 Role Vis-à-vis the FSB p. 252
  • IV The Distribution of Powers in the EU Financial Regulatory Architecture p. 254
  • A The ESFS, the EBU, and the Division of Regulation, Supervision, and Resolution p. 255
  • B The Blurring Division of Competences p. 257
  • C How 'Relative' is EU Authority in Financial Matters? The Impact of Global Standards on EU Regulation p. 258
  • V Global Financial Governance and Legitimacy Concerns p. 260
  • A The Limits to a Clear Articulation of Competences p. 261
  • B The Legitimacy of Global Financial Regulation: Perspectives and Research Agenda p. 263
  • VI The EU Financial Regulatory Architecture and the Global Financial Architecture: Source of Inspiration or Part of the Solution? p. 265
  • A Lessons from the EU Architecture for the Global One? p. 265
  • B EU Participation in Global Regulation: Addressing the Legitimacy Deficit of EU Agencies' Relative Authority p. 267
  • VII Concluding Remarks p. 269
  • 12 Relative Authority and Institutional Decision-making in World Trade Law and International Investment Law p. 271 Diane A Desierto
  • I Public Authority in Trade and Investment Rule-making p. 271
  • II Trade and Investment Rules, Decisions, and Authoritative Decision-makers p. 274
  • III Legitimacy Assets, Accountability, and Reform in Trade and Investment p. 282
  • A Internal Checking Functions and External Constraints on Trade Rule-making p. 284
  • B Internal Checking Functions and External Constraints on Investment Rule-making p. 286
  • IV Conclusion p. 290
  • Index p. 291

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