Checking the courts : law, ideology, and contingent discretion

How does the language of legislative statutes affect judicial behavior? Scholars of the judiciary have rarely studied this question despite statutes being, theoretically, the primary opportunity for legislatures to ensure that those individuals who interpret the law will follow their preferences. In Checking the Courts , Kirk A. Randazzo and Richard W. Waterman offer a model that integrates ideological and legal factors through an empirical measure of statutory discretion. The model is tested across multiple judicial institutions, at both the federal and state levels, and reveals that judges are influenced by the levels of discretion afforded in the legislative statutes. In those cases where lawmakers have clear policy preferences, legislation encourages judges to strictly interpret the plain meaning of the law. Conversely, if policy preferences are unclear, legislation leaves open the possibility that judges will make decisions based on their own ideological policy preferences. Checking the Courts thus provides us with a better understanding of the dynamic interplay between law and ideology.

• List of Illustrations p. vii
• Acknowledgments p. xi
• 1 Introduction p. 1
• Anecdotal Evidence of Statutory Influence on Judges p. 3
• Systematic Statutory Influences on Judicial Behavior p. 5
• Measuring Legal Factors p. 7
• Organization of the Book p. 9
• 2 Theoretical Foundations p. 11
• Approaches to Interpretation and the Canons of Statutory Construction p. 12
• Separation of Powers Models p. 17
• Influence of Law and Ideology on Judicial Behavior p. 21
• Placing Judicial Decision Making into a Broader Theoretical Context p. 25
• The Model of Contingent Discretion p. 28
• Operationalization of Statutory Discretion p. 37
• Conclusions p. 38
• 3 U.S. Courts of Appeals p. 41
• Historical Development of the Federal Appellate Courts p. 42
• Anecdotal Evidence from Appeals Court Judges p. 44
• Empirical Analysis of Statutory Influence p. 47
• Circuit-Specific Analyses of Statutory Influence p. 57
• An Alternative Specification p. 58
• Conclusions p. 62
• 4 The U.S. Supreme Court p. 63
• Historical Development of the Supreme Court p. 65
• Anecdotal Evidence from Supreme Court Justices p. 66
• Empirical Evidence Analysis of Statutory Influence p. 71
• Justice-Specific Analyses of Statutory Influence p. 85
• An Alternative Specification p. 87
• Examination of Statutes Under Judicial Review p. 89
• Corollary Analysis of Statutes and Unanimous Decisions p. 92
• Conclusions p. 94
• 5 State Supreme Courts p. 97
• Influence of Law and Ideology on State Supreme Courts p. 98
• Anecdotal Evidence from Stale Court Judges p. 100
• Empirical Analysis of Statutory Influence p. 103
• Corollary Analysis of Statutes and Judicial Elections/Appointments p. 113
• Conclusions p. 116
• 6 Temporal Analysis of Supreme Court Behavior p. 119
• The Temporal Nature of the Law p. 120
• Evolution of Congressional Statutory Language p. 124
• Empirical Analysis of Statutory Influence versus Judicial Annotations p. 129
• Corollary Analysis of Statutes and Unanimous Decisions p. 135
• Conclusions p. 137
• 7 Toward a New Paradigm p. 141
• Summary of Empirical Evidence p. 143
• Theoretical and Substantive Implications p. 145
• Important Caveats p. 152
• Remaining Questions p. 153
• Appendix p. 155
• Notes p. 179
• References p. 189
• Index p. 199